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Abstract
The correctness of deep neural networks is well-known to
be vulnerable to small, ‘adversarial’ perturbations of their
inputs. Although studying these attacks is valuable, they
do not necessarily conform to any real-world threat model.
This has led to interest in the generation of—and robust-
ness to—unrestricted adversarial inputs, which are not
constructed as small perturbations of correctly-classified
ground-truth inputs. We introduce a novel algorithm to
generate realistic unrestricted adversarial inputs, in the
sense that they cannot reliably be distinguished from the
training dataset by a human. This is achieved by modi-
fying generative adversarial networks: a generator neural
network is trained to construct examples that deceive a
fixed target network (so they are adversarial) while also
deceiving the usual co-training discriminator network (so
they are realistic). Our approach is demonstrated by the
generation of unrestricted adversarial inputs for a trained
image classifier that is robust to perturbation-based at-
tacks. We find that human judges are unable to identify
which image out of ten was generated by our method
about 50% of the time, providing evidence that they are
moderately realistic.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks have achieved im-
pressive results in a wide range of domains. But some of
these successes may be precarious, since they often de-
pend on an unwarranted assumption: that the inputs to
the trained neural network will always be independently
drawn from a fixed probability distribution. This as-
sumption may not be valid because someone deliberately
presents inputs they hope will induce incorrect outputs,
because the distribution in question changes over time,
or simply because the training dataset failed to capture
the full distribution of plausibly-occurring inputs.
If this assumption cannot be relied upon, the im-
plications can be dramatic. Szegedy et al. [1] discov-
ered that neural networks are vulnerable to what they
termed adversarial inputs: by imperceptibly perturbing
correctly-classified inputs in carefully-chosen directions,
the accuracy of any state-of-the-art neural network could
be almost arbitrarily decreased. Since then, the ma-
chine learning community has focused a great deal of
research effort on this phenomenon. Many methods for
the construction of adversarial perturbations have been
introduced [2]. Many attempts to create neural networks
resilient to such perturbations have also been suggested
[3], along with a variety of approaches aiming to give
formal guarantees about the performance of a network
when the inputs are adversarial in this sense [4].
Recently, there has been increasing interest in the
construction of adversarial inputs that are unrestricted,
in the sense that they do not necessarily derive from a
perturbation of a natural input [5, 6]. Robustness against
perturbation-based attacks alone is likely to be necessary
but not sufficient for the safe deployment of a neural
network if its inputs are not guaranteed to be drawn
from a fixed distribution [7].
The main contribution of this paper is a novel and
general method for the generation of unrestricted adver-
sarial inputs. The inputs generated by our method also
have the important property of being realistic, in the
sense that a human cannot reliably distinguish between
generated and pre-existing dataset inputs. As described
in Section 3, the key idea is to train generative adversarial
networks so that the generated examples are not only
realistic, but simultaneously are misclassified by some
target classifier network.
We demonstrate our method by generating unre-
stricted adversarial examples of handwritten digits to
attack a provably locally-robust classifier trained byWong
and Kolter [8]. Examples are given in Figure 1. In exper-
iments detailed in Section 4, we presented judges with
nine dataset images and one generated unrestricted ad-
versarial example, and found that they selected a dataset
Figure 1: Ten generated unrestricted adversarial inputs.
These were hand-selected as being visually similar to the
training dataset, yet the shortest distance between any of
these ten and any image in the training dataset is large
under all usual lp norms (see Table 1 for details).
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image as the most likely to have been generated about
50% of the time, providing evidence of their ability to
fool humans. The ability of our method to easily gen-
erate unrestricted adversarial examples for a provably
locally-robust network provides further confirmation of
the need to considering threat models beyond lp-norm
constrained perturbations.
This paper is the first step in a broader research aspi-
ration, discussed in Section 6: the automatic generation
of tests—in a variety of domains—which are both useful
and realistic.
2 Background
Our method relies on an understanding of generative
adversarial networks, explained in this section.
2.1 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [9] are a class of
generative machine learning models involving the simul-
taneous training of two neural networks: a generator g
and a discriminator d, with parameters θ and φ respec-
tively. Given a dataset D ⊆ X of samples drawn from a
probability distribution pD, the aim is that g implicitly
models this distribution by learning to generate samples
drawn from it. In particular, the input to g is a random
noise variable z ∼ pz, so the goal is that g(z; θ) ∼ pD,
where θ are the learned parameters of the generator.
In the original GAN model [9], the output of dis-
criminator network d(x;φ) is intended to represent the
probability that a given example x is drawn from the
data distribution pD as opposed to being an output of
the generator g. The generator and the discriminator
are adversarial in that they each attempt to outdo the
other during training. The loss function for the generator
Lg = Ez∼pz [− log(d(g(z; θ);φ))] decreases as the discrim-
inator d wrongly predicts that the generated examples
are drawn from pD, while the loss function for the dis-
criminator Ld = −Lg + Ex∼pD [− log(d(x;φ))] rewards
the discriminator for correctly identifying the source of
its inputs.
2.2 Wasserstein GANs
While GANs can produce impressive results, their train-
ing behaviour is notoriously temperamental. As a result,
a large number of modifications to the original GAN
architecture have been proposed [10]. The Wasserstein
GAN variant [11] aims to make training more stable by
designing the discriminator (renamed ‘critic’) to approxi-
mate the Wasserstein distance between the distribution
generated by gθ and the data distribution pD, proving a
more reliable gradient. Since the dual representation of
the Wasserstein distance used in this model requires the
function to be 1-Lipschitz continuous, an additional ‘gra-
dient penalty’ loss term Lgp can be added to implement
this constraint [12].
The loss functions for this Wasserstein GAN with
gradient penalty (WGAN-GP) are:
Lg = E
z∼pz
[−d(g(z; θ);φ)]
Ld = −Lg + E
x∼pD
[−d(x;φ)] + λLgp
where gradient penalty Lgp = Ex˜∼pI [(‖∇x˜dφ(x˜)‖2 − 1)2],
where pI denotes the distribution sampling uniformly at
random from the linear interpolations between generated
samples and examples from pD.
2.3 Conditional GANs
The original proposal for a conditional generative adver-
sarial network (CGAN) learns to generate samples from a
conditional distribution [13]; both the generator and the
discriminator are given the data y that we wish to condi-
tion on in addition to their usual inputs. The training
procedure is modified only to appropriately vary y.
An extension of this approach is the auxiliary classi-
fier generative adversarial network (ACGAN) [14], which
modifies the structure of the discriminator. Rather than
pass the auxiliary information y as an input to the discrim-
inator, the discriminator now gives a secondary output
vector predicting the value of y for the input it receives.
The loss functions for both the discriminator and gener-
ator are given an extra term which decreases when the
accuracy of these predictions increases.
3 Generating Realistic Unrestricted Ad-
versarial Inputs
3.1 Problem Definition
Suppose we have a trained target classifier network
f : X → Y which attempts to approximate a function
h : X → Y . For most digital domains X, there is only a
subset R ⊂ X which may occur naturally. For instance,
if X is the set of 4-second audio clips, then only a small
subset R of these clips could realistically be an unaltered
studio-quality recording of a human voice. Given f and
a training dataset D ⊂ R× Y , we aim to generate new
test inputs xˆ ∈ X which are:
1. Adversarial in the sense that the neural network’s
output is incorrect: f(xˆ) 6= h(xˆ).
2. Realistic in the sense that a human could not reliably
identify whether a given input was generated by our
method or drawn from the set of naturally-occurring
inputs, R.
3. Unrestricted in the sense that the input xˆ can be in
any region of the input space X, unlike perturbation-
based approaches, which limit adversarial examples
to be close to some known input x ∈ D under some
distance metric.
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Figure 2: Diagram showing main data paths in the forward computation of loss functions. The generator and
discriminator are trained by backpropagating loss gradients in the opposite direction to the arrows. This diagram is
for high-level intuition only: for specific details, please refer to Algorithm 1. For instance, note that the generator
loss is computed using generated inputs only, while the discriminator is trained on a mixture of generated and
dataset examples.
3.2 Our Method
The key idea is to modify the training of the generator of a
generative adversarial network to jointly optimise for two
objectives. The first is the usual objective of deceiving
the discriminator network so it cannot reliably identify
whether a given input was generated by our method
or drawn from the dataset D. This incentivises the
generator to output realistic inputs. The second objective
is the deception of the target network f , incentivising
the generation of (unrestricted) adversarial inputs.
The main challenge we overcame was the difficulty in
devising a training procedure that successfully optimises
both of these objectives. Even assuming that the discrim-
inator gives a good gradient to improve how realistic the
generated examples are, simply summing the two loss
terms would be unlikely to lead to success. This is be-
cause of the relationship between the two loss landscapes:
in some cases, it appears that the objectives are locally
in conflict. While examples exist that are both realistic
and adversarial, the nearest realistic example to a given
point may be in the opposite direction from the nearest
adversarial example, which is bad news for using a greedy
gradient-step algorithm.
For instance, consider a stage in training at which
the generated examples would be completely realistic,
except for a small consistently-included artefact. Locally,
the two objective gradients may be directly opposed:
taking a step towards removing the unrealistic artefact
may significantly reduce the rate at which the generated
input fools the target classifier, yet taking a step towards
strengthening the artefact may make it significantly easier
for the discriminator to identify the generated examples.
As a result, a naive training procedure may get stuck at
a local optimum.
There is also reason to believe that the two objectives
being locally in conflict is a common occurrence. The
phenomenon of adversarial examples was so surprising
because it appears that there is an adversarial example
very near any point in the input space. Conversely, the set
of realistic inputs occupies relatively small and contiguous
3
regions. Therefore, it is likely that a gradient walk from
a random point towards a region of realistic inputs is
likely to stray dangerously close to regions of unrealistic
adversarial inputs, from which the gradient from the
loss term incentivising examples to be adversarial may
prevent escape.
To minimise the chance of getting stuck in such an un-
realistic but adversarial local optimum, we first pretrain
the GAN using an ordinary training procedure before
adversarially finetuning. By beginning our search for
realistic unrestricted adversarial examples in regions of
realistic examples, we maximise our chances of converging
to nearby optima.
3.2.1 Realistic Pretraining
Any existing GAN algorithm could be used for the pre-
training step, allowing our method to leverage the signif-
icant advances that are being made in this area. In our
experiments, we combine three established architectures:
a Wasserstein GAN with gradient penalty (WGAN-GP)
[12], a conditional GAN (CGAN) [13] and an auxiliary
classifier GAN (ACGAN) [14]. Figure 2 shows the flow
of data during training.
The generator g : Rm × Y → X is a convolutional
neural network. Its inputs are a vector of random noise,
which is the source of diversity of its outputs, and a one-
hot vector specifying the desired true label of the example
to be generated.
The discriminator network is a combination of a condi-
tional WGAN-GP critic, which learns an approximation
of the Wasserstein distance between the generated and
training-set conditional distributions, and an auxiliary
classifier, which predicts the likelihood of the possible val-
ues of h(x). We combined these two architectures in an
attempt to strengthen the gradient provided to the gen-
erator, helping to generate data which are both realistic
and for which the true (i.e., human-judged) labels match
the intended true labels. The critic is given the true label
of the data h(x) to improve its training, but the auxiliary
classifier must not have access to this information since
its purpose is to predict it. We therefore split the discrim-
inator d into three sub-networks. Network d0 : X → Ri
effectively preprocesses the input, passing an intermedi-
ate representation to the critic network d1 : Ri × Y → R
and the auxiliary classifier network d2 : Ri → [0, 1]|Y |.
The loss functions from the WGAN-GP and ACGAN
algorithms are combined as might be expected; the train-
ing procedure is given as part of Algorithm 1. The loss
for the discriminator is the sum of three terms: ld1 re-
wards the network if d1 well approximates the Wasserstein
distance between the generated and training data; ld2
rewards the network if d2 accurately classifies the train-
ing data; lgp is the WGAN gradient penalty, rewarding
the network for being 1-Lipschitz continuous. The loss
for the generator is the sum of two terms: ld1 rewards
the generator if the d1 approximation of the Wasserstein
distance is low, meaning that the generated images are
close to the real distribution; ld2 rewards the network if
the training data is given the correct classification by d2.
Note that while the values of ld1 and ld2 are not the same
for the training of the generator and the discriminator,
they appear at the same point in the dataflow and have
directly-related interpretations, which is why they share
names and block representations in Figure 2.
3.2.2 Adversarial Finetuning
Once we have pretrained a GAN to generate realistic
inputs, we perform adversarial finetuning. This is also
given in Algorithm 1 and Figure 2. Training continues,
but a new loss function is used for the generator network,
the product of two terms: lr is the loss used during
pretraining, which rewards realistic images; la is the new
term, which rewards the generator if the generated image
is misclassified by the target network f . Empirically, we
found that taking their product resulted in more realistic
images than using their sum. A targeted attack can be
used so that la rewards the network only if the computed
label output by f matches a specified target computed
label, as opposed to any incorrect label.
Both lr and la can be negative, yet we need the gener-
ator loss to always be a monotonically increasing function
of each, so we scale each term using
s(l) =
{
1 + exp(l) if l ≤ 0
2 + l otherwise
before computing their product. This scaling function
has another advantage: the generator does not receive
a reward for attaining strongly negative values of either
loss term for a given example. This is reminiscent of the
clipping parameter in the Carlini & Wagner attack [15],
which does not reward high-confidence misclassifications
in proportion to their confidence. In our context, this
helps to prevents adversarial loss from dominating realis-
tic loss.
Note that besides improving the quality of the gen-
erated data, our use of a conditional GAN allows us to
specify an intended true label to the generator, which
the true label of the generated example is very likely to
match. In this way, we can reward the generator for gen-
erating examples which are very likely to be adversarial
by assuming that an example is misclassified if the com-
puted label output by the target classifier does not match
the intended true label. Our experiments described in
section 4.2 found this assumption to mostly hold.
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Algorithm 1 Training a GAN to generate realistic unrestricted adversarial examples.
Require:
Training dataset, D. Batch size, b.
Gradient penalty coefficient, λ. Adam hyperparameters, α, β1, β2.
Generator neural network, g, with initial parameters, θ.
Discriminator neural networks, d0, d1, d2, with initial parameters, φ0, φ1, φ2.
Trained target neural network, f . Attack rate, µ.
1: procedure TrainGan
2: repeat
3: (x, y) ← sample batch of size b from D
4: z ← sample batch of size b from N (0, Im)
5: xˆ← g(z, y; θ)
6: if odd iteration then
7: ld ← DiscriminatorLoss(x, xˆ, y, λ, φ0, φ1, φ2)
8: (φ0, φ1, φ2)← Adam(ld;φ0, φ1, φ2;α, β1, β2)
9: else
10: t← sample from U(0, 1)
11: if pretraining or t ≥ µ then
12: lg ← PretrainingGeneratorLoss(xˆ, y, φ0, φ1, φ2)
13: else
14: lg ← FinetuningGeneratorLoss(xˆ, y, φ0, φ1, φ2)
15: θ ← Adam(lg; θ;α, β1, β2)
16: until convergence
Algorithm 2 Compute the loss for the discriminator network given dataset samples x and generated examples xˆ.
1: procedure DiscriminatorLoss(x, xˆ, y, λ, φ0, φ1, φ2)
2: ld1 ← −d1(d0(x;φ0), y;φ1) + d1(d0(xˆ;φ0), y;φ1)
3: ld2 ← − log(d2(d0(x;φ0);φ2)y)
4: ← sample from U(0, 1)
5: xinterp ←  · x+ (1− ) · xˆ
6: lgp ← (‖∇d1(d0(xinterp;φ0), y;φ1)‖2 − 1)2
7: ld = ld1 + ld2 + λ · lgp
8: return ld
Algorithm 3 Compute the pretraining and finetuning losses for the generator network given generated examples xˆ.
1: procedure PretrainingGeneratorLoss(xˆ, y, φ0, φ1, φ2)
2: ld1 ← −d1(d0(xˆ;φ0), y;φ1)
3: ld2 ← − log(d2(d0(xˆ;φ0);φ2)y)
4: lg ← ld1 + ld2
5: return lg
6: procedure FinetuningGeneratorLoss(xˆ, y, φ0, φ1, φ2)
7: lr ← PretrainingGeneratorLoss(xˆ, y, φ0, φ1, φ2)
8: if targeted attack (with target label c) then
9: la ← maxi 6=c f(xˆ)i − f(xˆ)c
10: else
11: la ← f(xˆ)y −maxi 6=y f(xˆ)i
12: procedure ScaleLoss(l)
13: if l < 0 then return 1 + exp(l)
14: else return 2 + l
15: lg ←ScaleLoss(lr) · ScaleLoss(la)
16: return lg
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3.2.3 Stochastic Loss Selection
While initial experiments gave somewhat promising re-
sults, the proportion of generated inputs which were
misclassified rose quickly to almost 100%, and stayed
there, while the images being generated were not as visu-
ally realistic as could be hoped. It seemed that the local
optima of the type discussed in section 3.2 were trapping
the training process: no steps in the direction of more
realistic examples were taken because the gradient was
dominated by the loss term la rewarding misclassifica-
tions.
To address this, we introduced a new hyperparameter,
the ‘attack rate’ µ. During the adversarial finetuning
stage of training, the finetuning loss function is used only
with probability µ; with probability 1−µ, the pretraining
loss function is used. These gradient steps can be used to
escape local optima of unrealistic adversarial examples.
4 Experimental Results
Our method aims to generate realistic unrestricted ad-
versarial inputs. We therefore conducted experiments
to check whether the generated examples were indeed
realistic, unrestricted and adversarial.
The domain we use to evaluate our training process is
image classification, making use of the well-known MNIST
dataset of handwritten digits [16], since human evaluation
of how realistic the generated examples are is particularly
easy. The classifier we target is a convolutional network
trained by Wong and Kolter [8], which is provably locally
robust in the sense that there is guaranteed to be no
adversarial input within  = 0.1 of 94.2% of test inputs
under the l∞ norm.
We implemented our architecture in Python using
the Pytorch library. For each of the ten possible target
labels – plus the untargeted case, which aims for any mis-
classification – a GAN was adversarially finetuned using
Algorithm 1. After training converged, each finetuned
generator was used to generate examples for all intended
true labels. We then filtered these generated images to
retain only those inputs for which the computed label
matched the target computed label. Images were gen-
erated until 200 such filtered examples were generated
for each intended true label/target label pairing or until
100 seconds had elapsed. Interestingly, this led to no
expected-adversarial examples with intended true label
‘0’ and target classification ‘1’, so this case is omitted.
Figure 4 and Appendix F give examples of generated
images for which the computed label matches the target
classification. Figure 3 gives the same, but attacking a
non-robust network.
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Figure 3: Randomly-selected images generated by a fine-
tuned GAN to attack a non-robust classifier. The com-
puted label given by the classifier matches the target
label for each image.
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Figure 4: Randomly-selected images generated by a fine-
tuned GAN to attack a locally-robust classifier. The
computed label given by the classifier matches the target
label for each image.
4.1 Does our method generate unrestricted in-
puts?
Since our method does not work by perturbing existing
data, only a simple sanity check was required to verify
that the generated images are not close to images in the
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Table 1: Comparison of smallest ‘perturbation’ distances
between any image in Figure 1 and any image in the
training set with typical perturbation magnitudes seen
in the literature. Calculated with pixel values normalised
to [0, 1].
Distance
metric
Smallest seen
‘perturbation’
Typical adversarial
perturbation size
l0 508 Less than 40 [17]
l1 22.8 Less than 5 [18]
l2 3.28 About 1.5 [19]
l∞ 0.838 About 0.1 [20, 8]
training set, as could be caused by over-fitting.
We selected ten generated adversarial inputs which
are visually similar to the training set, and computed
the shortest distances between each of the ten and all
images in the training set. The selected images are given
in Figure 1. Table 1 shows that although the images
appear realistic, they are much further from any training
example under the usual lp norms than a perturbation-
based attack.
4.2 Does our method generate unrestricted ad-
versarial inputs?
An unrestricted adversarial input with respect to a target
neural network is any input for which the output given
by the neural network is incorrect.
We hope that the generated inputs for which the label
computed by the classifier matches the target label are
unrestricted adversarial inputs. However, this is only the
case if their true label matches the intended true label
given as input to the generator, else it could be that
the generator has started simply ignoring this input and
generating images which visually match the target class.
To check that the finetuned generators are behaving
as hoped, we used workers on Amazon’s MTurk platform
to label the generated images. We used a sample size of
100 judges for each intended true label/target label pair
for each experiment. Figure 5 shows the proportion of
inputs for which not only does the label computed by the
classifier match the target label, but the human-judged
true label matches the intended true label specified to
the generator. The mean number of correct labels for the
untargeted attack is 80%; this is comparable with the
success rate of 85% achieved by Song et al. [6] against
a different target classifier. These high rates reassure
us that our method really does generate successful unre-
stricted adversarial inputs.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
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0 96 94 90 85 96 97 99 85 89 95
1 00 66 88 69 97 89 74 91 81 87
2 69 89 82 58 82 70 64 79 49 75
3 43 84 81 68 74 46 82 54 71 53
4 84 67 86 74 75 96 79 82 77 76
5 58 75 70 78 79 52 82 69 81 75
6 82 90 95 73 84 84 86 94 84 82
7 75 75 88 82 76 95 88 92 59 80
8 76 85 91 76 98 97 77 75 91 83
9 77 68 90 84 95 92 88 95 95 90
Mean 70 81 85 81 79 88 78 82 82 76 80
Figure 5: The success rates of the adversarial attacks
by finetuned GANs. More precisely, of generated images
for which the computed label output by the classifier
matches the target label, the percentage which are truly
adversarial (in the sense that the true label of the image
matches the intended true label passed to the generator
network) is reported.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
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0 40 60 56 34 46 51 40 36 63 51
1 00 37 52 36 51 81 40 53 35 49
2 30 37 43 40 42 35 37 55 32 54
3 39 39 43 34 40 40 42 45 48 40
4 51 50 34 38 37 46 42 41 43 40
5 32 34 32 36 43 42 36 37 55 51
6 51 39 45 36 57 46 45 57 40 46
7 47 48 53 33 42 58 41 52 44 39
8 29 46 47 55 44 48 36 39 42 60
9 38 34 50 49 54 53 53 69 57 67
Mean 40 41 45 44 43 47 47 43 48 45 50
Figure 6: Measures of how realistic the adversarial images
generated by finetuned GANs are. More precisely, the
percentage of generated inputs for which the classified
label matches the target label which were not identified
as being generated when placed amongst nine images
from the training dataset. If the generated images were
completely realistic, the expected result would be 90.
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Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
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l
0 73 91 62 62 91 77 88 50 59 75
1 00 49 51 80 06 31 47 61 77 57
2 13 62 53 32 30 30 52 50 19 60
3 29 69 60 26 60 12 79 22 28 71
4 42 55 66 43 70 80 70 48 73 65
5 18 46 55 61 54 29 59 31 51 60
6 50 60 80 87 74 80 74 54 59 66
7 22 43 82 63 31 64 00 62 38 40
8 70 68 80 75 75 91 63 50 80 79
9 55 66 88 74 88 92 66 87 69 88
Mean 37 60 72 63 58 65 43 67 50 54 66
Figure 7: The success rates of the adversarial attacks by
a pretrained but not finetuned GAN. More precisely, of
generated images for which the computed label output
by the classifier matches the target label, the percentage
which are truly adversarial (in the sense that the true
label of the image matches the intended true label passed
to the generator network) is reported.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
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0 48 63 53 53 62 56 46 40 37 54
1 00 34 52 50 37 27 52 47 46 42
2 42 39 51 39 30 36 54 49 40 43
3 41 47 55 42 55 47 53 41 47 51
4 49 52 41 46 45 50 51 45 66 57
5 38 50 43 56 47 54 44 51 48 51
6 49 52 47 50 46 55 38 62 46 48
7 39 57 59 36 49 45 32 41 57 59
8 52 50 59 52 56 57 43 39 51 59
9 51 51 66 53 74 61 53 73 48 68
Mean 45 50 52 50 51 50 44 50 47 49 53
Figure 8: Measures of how realistic the adversarial im-
ages generated by a pretrained but not finetuned GAN
are. More precisely, the percentage of generated inputs
for which the classified label matches the target label
which were not identified as being generated when placed
amongst nine images from the training dataset. If the
generated images were completely realistic, the expected
result would be 90.
4.3 Are the generated adversarial inputs realis-
tic?
A set of inputs is realistic with respect to a dataset if a
human cannot reliably identify to which set an example
belongs.
In order to check whether the sets of images generated
by the adversarially finetuned GANs are realistic, we
again used MTurk workers. After familiarising themselves
with examples from the training dataset, each worker was
presented with ten images—nine from the dataset and one
generated—and asked to identify the image they believed
was most likely to be computer-generated rather than a
sample from the dataset. If the generated images were
entirely realistic, we would expect the generated image
to evade selection 910 = 90% of the time. If the generated
images were entirely unrealistic, we would expect the
generated image to be evade identification 0% of the
time. Figure 6 shows the proportion of the time that
generated adversarial images were identified as such.
The current state of the art, Song et al. [6], perform
a similar analysis, except that judges are presented with
only two choices each time: one dataset sample and
one generated image. For comparability, we also run
this experiment for each of the finetuned GANs, with
the full results given Appendix E. Targeting Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust network [8], Song et al. report
that participants do not identify the generated image
21.8% of the time [6]; an untargeted attack using our
method against the same network generates images which
remain inconspicuous 24% of the time. This difference is
probably not statistically significant.
4.4 How does performance depend on the target
network?
For comparison, we ran the same experiments as above
but attacking a non-robust classifier network. Of the
generated images for which the computed label matched
the intended computed label, the proportion for which the
true label also matched the intended true label was 90%
(vs. 80% against the robust classifier), and the proportion
which were not identified as being generated was 60%
(vs. 50% against the robust classifier.) Similar differences
were seen in targeted attacks; full results are given in
Appendix D, and generated samples are given in Figure 3.
4.5 How much does the finetuning step improve
performance?
The experiments described above were rerun but using a
pretrained rather than finetuned GAN.
Unsurprisingly, we found that the desired misclassifi-
cations occurred far less frequently than when generated
by a finetuned GAN. Furthermore, of the inputs for which
the classifier-computed label matched the target classifica-
tion, the proportion for which the true label also matched
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the intended true label was also significantly lower with-
out adversarial finetuning: 66% for untargeted attacks
and 58% on average for targeted attacks, compared to
80% for both categories after finetuning (see Figure 7).
The images from the pretrained GAN for which the com-
puted label matched the target classification were slightly
less realistic than those from the finetuned GANs: out
of a selection of ten, the generated images were not iden-
tified by human judges were 53% and 50% of the time
respectively (see Figure 8).
In short, we found that finetuning a GAN using our
method roughly maintains how realistic its generated
expected-adversarial images are, while significantly in-
creasing their quantity and increasing the proportion
which are true adversarial inputs by around 15 percent-
age points.
Note that while we anecdotally found that by increas-
ing the ‘attack rate’ hyperparameter, the proportion of
images generated which were adversarial could be in-
creased to almost 100%, this was at the cost of making
them less realistic; it may be interesting to quantify the
nature of this trade-off in the future.
4.6 Threats to Validity
We discuss reasons not to believe our claim that our
method can generate realistic unrestricted adversarial
examples below.
4.6.1 Internal Validity
The evaluation of the generated images relies entirely on
the quality of the data provided by the MTurk workers.
We therefore took a number of measures to ensure that
participants understood the instructions and completed
the tasks diligently:
• Only workers with good track records were permitted
to participate.
• The instructions specified that particular answers
should be given to specified questions to prove that
the instructions had been read carefully. Approx-
imately 10% of work was rejected for failing this
check.
• For the image labelling tasks, some images with
known labels were included to check that the right
labels were being given. Reassuringly, almost no
work was rejected for failing this check.
• For the identification of the generated images, a
bonus nearly doubling the pay per image was given
for each correctly-identified image, providing an ex-
tra incentive to try hard.
• To remove the incentive to save time by randomly
clicking answers, a minimum time spent answering
each question was enforced.
• If questions were left unanswered, we interpreted
this as a sign of carelessness and did not use any of
the data from that task.
To best understand the quality and nature of the
images generated by our method, we invite you to inspect
generated images for yourself in Appendix F.
4.6.2 External Validity
While we can see no reason that our method would fail
when applied to other datasets and domains in which
GANs have produced good results—indeed, we believe
our method will be more successful on more complex
datasets, as discussed in Section 5.2—it is true that we
have so far only demonstrated it on one simple dataset.
We therefore cannot be certain that our method will
generalise until we try it.
We look forward to reporting success in applying our
adversarial finetuning procedure to a pretrained state-of-
the-art GAN.
5 Discussion and Related Work
5.1 Robustness of Neural Networks
Since the discovery that state-of-the-art neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarially-crafted perturbations [1],
the machine learning community has rightly devoted
much effort into developing attacks, defences and prov-
able guarantees centred on local robustness. This is the
property that a neural network’s performance cannot be
significantly degraded by imperceptible perturbations to
inputs taken from the training distribution. As we do
not have a computable function that is a good proxy for
humans’ ability to perceive differences, being ‘impercepti-
ble’ is usually very roughly approximated by constraining
perturbations to be with an lp-norm bound (although
there have been some successful attacks involving other
kinds of meaning-preserving perturbation [21]).
But while there remains agreement that working to-
wards local robustness is a valuable research goal [22],
consensus has also grown that safe deployment against
any realistic threat model will require something stronger
than local robustness [7, 23].
Of the plausible threat models suggested by Gilmer et
al. [7], the notion of a ‘content-constrained input’, which
has also become known as an ‘unrestricted adversarial
input’, has received the most attention so far, being the
focus of a contest [5] and Song et al.’s recent paper [6].
But given the immense challenge that achieving even
local robustness poses, we speculate that robustness to
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unrestricted adversarial inputs is many years away. We
suggest that a more achievable research objective might
be robustness to realistic unrestricted adversarial exam-
ples (or ‘non-suspicious’ inputs according to Gilmer et
al.’s taxonomy [7]).
We expect this to be more achievable since the neu-
ral network would be required to behave correctly for
a vastly smaller volume of input space. In Brown et
al.’s challenge to be robust to unrestricted adversarial
inputs [5], any image containing a bicycle should not be
classified as a bird. Supposing that input images are 240
by 240 pixels, each of which can take 256 values, there are
about 256200×280 ' 10135,000 possible images for which
the top-left 40 by 40 pixels are a small image of a bike.
By contrast, given that naturally-occurring inputs tend
to occupy only a low-volume manifold within the input
space [24, p. 160], it seems likely that the volume of
inputs which could be mistaken for a naturally-occurring
input would be much smaller.
A network robust to all realistic unrestricted adversar-
ial inputs could furthermore be safely deployed so long
as a human checked that each input appeared plausibly
natural; Gilmer et al. describe several scenarios in which
this could be applied in practice [7].
Although our method found it around ten percentage
points more difficult to generate realistic unrestricted
adversarial inputs when the target classifier was locally
robust (as described in Section 4.4), it was still able
to generate an abundance of such examples. This is
clear evidence that local robustness alone does not im-
ply robustness to realistic unrestricted adversarial inputs.
Therefore, in ongoing work, we are exploring the extent
to which our generated examples can be used to improve
robustness to this class of inputs. One of the most success-
ful approaches to improving neural networks’ robustness
to perturbation-based attacks has been to include adver-
sarial inputs in the training data [25, 26, 27]; this may
prove fruitful in the unrestricted case as well.
5.2 Adversarial Input Generation
Song et al. [6] introduce an imaginative method for gen-
erating unrestricted adversarial inputs: first train a aux-
iliary classifier GAN on the dataset, then search in latent
space for inputs to the generator that deceive the target
network while being confidently correctly classified by the
auxiliary classifier. In common with our approach, this
method relies on pretraining a GAN to generate realistic
examples before using another procedure to obtain unre-
stricted adversarial examples from these. As discussed
in Section 4, the adversarial images generated by both
methods are comparable in terms of success rate and
realism.
The key difference is the method. Gilmer et al. [7]
introduced the idea of a ‘test set attack’: one source
of ‘adversarial examples’ is simply to try images from
test set for which the network gives the wrong answer.
Song et al.’s approach can be considered a generalisation
of this: assuming that the trained GAN has learnt the
data distribution well, their method is simply to search
in this distribution for images classified differently by
the auxiliary classifier as by the target network. In a
sense, this is a search for plausible edge cases within the
original distribution. By contrast, our approach does not
necessarily search within the original distribution: the
loss term rewarding adversarial images pulls away from it,
while the loss term from the discriminator pulls towards
it, resulting in adversarial examples which are nearby
but not necessarily in the original distribution. For this
reason, we conjecture that our approach may be more
successful at finding unrestricted adversarial inputs for
a target network with excellent performance throughout
the original data distribution.
Xiao et al. [28] train a GAN to generate adversarial
perturbations given a realistic input. The loss function
used to train the generator is a linear combination of
plain GAN training, the original loss function of the tar-
get network (using target labels rather than true labels),
and a term regularising the size of the generated per-
turbations. The crucial difference is that our approach
leverages the key advantage of GANs—the generation
of realistic examples from scratch—to construct unre-
stricted adversarial examples, while Xiao et al. use the
GAN loss term to ensure that perturbed images remain
realistic.
Interestingly, Xiao et al. evaluate whether MTurk
workers are able to distinguish adversarially-perturbed im-
ages from their originals using a side-by-side test (cf. Ap-
pendix E) and find that humans select the perturbed
image 50% of the time, no better than random, im-
plying that the adversarial images are entirely realis-
tic. These experiments, however, were performed using
high-resolution photographs; the examples of perturbed
MNIST images given in the paper have clear visual arte-
facts that would likely have resulted in a higher identifi-
cation rate should this dataset have been used instead.
We therefore conjecture that our approach to generating
realistic unrestricted adversarial examples will in fact
be easier with more complex datasets, since any arte-
facts would be less easy to distinguish in the noisier data.
This is consistent with the findings of Shafahi et al. [29],
who prove that image classes with lower ‘concentration’
(i.e., higher within-class variation or complexity) are more
susceptible to adversarial perturbations, and observe that
this plays out in practice, with MNIST being one of the
most difficult datasets to attack.
Both Baluja and Fischer [30] and Hayes and Danezis
[31] present different algorithms to train a neural network
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to generate targeted and ‘universal’ adversarial perturba-
tions respectively. In common with our approach, these
both entail the optimisation of two loss terms: one to
ensure the examples are realistic, another to ensure they
are adversarial. Of course, the essential difference is that
these methods generate small perturbations for existing
inputs, while our approach generates the more general
unrestricted adversarial examples.
Anderson et al. [32] introduced one of the first ap-
proaches to generating unrestricted adversarial examples,
using a repurposed autoencoder as a recurrent GAN for
the generation of web domain names. But their approach
is simply to use ordinary GAN training, meaning that
the generated unrestricted examples are only ‘adversarial’
against the discriminator network of the GAN pair. By
contrast, our approach facilitates the generation of unre-
stricted adversarial examples against any target classifier.
5.3 Dual-Objective GAN Training
To the best of our knowledge, relatively little work has
been done training GANs to simultaneously optimise for
a secondary objective so that the generated data both
are realistic and have some other desirable property.
Guimaraes et al. [33] extend the SeqGAN [34] ap-
proach of using reinforcement learning to train GANs
on discrete sequence by simply adding an additional re-
inforcement learning reward signal. This approach was
applied to generate molecules which were both realistic
and ‘drug-like’, and musical melodies which were both to
some extent realistic and tonal.
Cao and Kipf introduced MolGAN [35], which gener-
ates drug-like molecules with some success. In addition
to the usual GAN loss, the generator was incentivised
to maximise a score given to its generated molecules
by (a neural network approximation of) a third-party
drug-likeness evaluation function.
Besides working with discrete sequential and graph-
structured data instead of continuous image data, a sig-
nificant difference between these works and this paper is
that there is unlikely to be local conflict between the two
objectives being optimised for: it is not the case that a
greedy step in the direction of being more drug-like will
be in the opposite direction of being more molecule-like.
As discussed in Section 3, overcoming the local conflict
between more realistic and more adversarial images is
one of the key challenges we address.
6 Application to Test Generation
6.1 Problem: Realistic Test Generation
For many decades, all practical computer systems have
realised sufficiently complex input-output functions that
certainty in their correctness cannot be found by simply
enumerating the entire space of inputs and checking that
the system’s output on each input is as expected. In
response to this problem, the verification community have
introduced many successful innovations which provide
formal guarantees of system correctness [36, 37, 38].
But scale remains a huge challenge for formal verifica-
tion. If formal verification is not a possibility, then testing
of some description is the main mechanism by which bugs
are found and confidence in a system is increased. Since
only a small subset of possible inputs can be used as test
cases, the quality of a test suite is far more important
than its size. A test suite is high-quality if it is likely to
find any bugs which could plausibly be triggered when
the system is in deployment.
Given the expense of handwriting test suites, an ob-
vious goal is the automatic generation of test cases.
There have been many successes in this field: ‘auto-
matic test pattern generation’ is very well-established
in the hardware domain [39, 40]; a large number of test
input generation tools have been created for software,
from QuickCheck for high-level Haskell programs [41] to
bounded model checking for low-level embedded firmware
[42] and many others in between [43, 44]; there has even
been recent work on the generation of tests for neural
networks, based on structural coverage metrics [45]. But
all approaches to date share a common weakness: the
automatically generated tests are not realistic.
Humans leverage their intelligence and their mental
model of the system under test to design tests that best
cover the space of plausible inputs, system behaviours
and system failure modes. In particular, the test inputs
crafted are usually realistic, in the sense that they re-
semble data that the system could plausibly encounter
during deployment.
By contrast, the lack of real understanding of a test-
generation program about the system and the environ-
ment means that the generated test inputs may techni-
cally increase the coverage metric yet not represent the
kind of data that would naturally be encountered. Since
the aim of testing is to find bugs that could plausibly
affect deployment, a method for the generation of realistic
test cases would be valuable.
6.2 Potential Solution: Dual-Objective-Trained
GANs
The original motivation for this work was the generation
of realistic test cases. Our research hypothesis is that
given a human-written test suite and whitebox access
to a system under test, it is possible to train a GAN to
generate test inputs that are both realistic and useful in
some sense. In this paper, we have shown that it is possi-
ble to generate such test inputs for neural networks that
are both somewhat realistic and also useful in that they
are evidence of a ‘bug’ relating to the target network’s
correctness.
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In future work, we will explore whether realistic and
useful tests can be generated in other contexts. For
instance, rather than optimising for adversarial inputs
directly, which is only straightforwardly possible when
the system under test is differentiable, the finetuning
step could optimise to generate tests that maximise some
notion of coverage. The key challenge appears to be
coping with non-differentiable systems and metrics; rein-
forcement learning appears to be a promising solution.
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A Glossary
Unrestricted adversarial input. Any input to a
neural network for which the output of that network is
incorrect.
Realistic set of examples. A set whose members
cannot reliably be distinguished from the members of a
‘real’ dataset by a human.
Target classifier network. The fixed, already-
trained neural network for which unrestricted adversarial
inputs are to be generated.
Pretraining. The process of training a GAN as
usual; that is, to generate realistic inputs.
Adversarial finetuning. The process of training a
pretrained GAN to generate inputs which are realistic
unrestricted adversarial examples.
True label. The label that a reasonable human
would assign to an example.
Intended true label. The label passed to the gener-
ator; the generator then tries to generate an image which
has this label as its true label.
Computed label. The label given to an image by
the target classifier.
Target computed label. When adversarially fine-
tuned, The generator network tries to generate examples
whose computed label is this label.
Robustness to a class of inputs. The property
that the neural network does not give the incorrect answer
for any inputs in the specified class.
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B Neural Network Architectures and Hyperparameters
The WGAN-GP [12] and ACGAN [14] architectures were the starting points for the design of these neural networks.
Relatively little hyperparameter tuning was done beyond a little trial and error.
Table 2: Architecture for generator network, g.
Layer Type Kernel Strides Feature Maps Batch Norm. Dropout Activation
Fully-Connected N/A N/A 64 No 0 ReLU
Transposed Convolution 5× 5 2× 2 32 Yes 0.35 LeakyReLU
Transposed Convolution 5× 5 2× 2 8 Yes 0.35 LeakyReLU
Transposed Convolution 5× 5 2× 2 4 Yes 0.35 LeakyReLU
Fully-Connected N/A N/A 784 No 0 Tanh
Table 3: Architecture for discriminator subnetwork, d0. (Both d1 and d2 were single fully-connected layers.)
Layer Type Kernel Strides Feature Maps Batch Norm. Dropout Activation Function
Convolution 3× 3 2× 2 8 No 0.2 LeakyReLU
Convolution 3× 3 1× 1 16 No 0.2 LeakyReLU
Convolution 3× 3 2× 2 32 No 0.2 LeakyReLU
Convolution 3× 3 1× 1 64 No 0.2 LeakyReLU
Convolution 3× 3 2× 2 128 No 0.2 LeakyReLU
Convolution 3× 3 1× 1 256 No 0.2 LeakyReLU
Table 4: Hyperparameters for all networks.
Hyperparameter Value
Attack rate µ = 0.1
Learning rate α = 0.000005
Adam betas β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.999
Leaky ReLU slope 0.2
Minibatch size 100
Dimensionality of latent space 128
Weight initialisation Normally distributed as described by He et al. [46]
Coefficient of gradient penalty loss term λ = 10
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C Visual Effect of Adversarial Finetuning
(a) Samples from pretrained generator. (b) After 5,000 iterations of finetuning.
(c) After 10,000 iterations of finetuning. (d) After 20,000 iterations of finetuning.
(e) After 30,000 iterations of finetuning. (f) After 45,000 iterations of finetuning. We ended fine-tuning at this stage.
Figure 9: A sequence of images tracking the output of the generator network for one fixed random sample in latent
space as adversarial finetuning takes place. Five samples are given for each intended true label. The finetuning is
an untargeted attack against Wong and Kolter’s [8] locally-robust network.
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D Results of Experiments for Non-Robust Target Network
These results are targeting a simple convolutional neural network with LeakyReLU activations and three hidden
layers of size 256, 128 and 32, trained until convergence.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 93 96 96 99 93 95 97 94 97 96
1 00 92 100 92 97 96 88 96 96 93
2 73 86 82 80 87 92 84 87 75 81
3 88 83 87 81 88 81 89 96 90 92
4 84 53 79 69 78 90 90 81 87 85
5 84 89 77 89 88 79 94 88 88 83
6 96 83 92 95 93 95 93 100 96 94
7 93 59 89 95 85 94 80 99 94 92
8 96 86 97 93 98 93 90 92 92 91
9 93 76 96 97 97 91 89 93 89 98
Mean 88 79 89 91 90 91 88 91 92 91 90
Figure 10: The success rates of the adversarial attacks
by finetuned GANs. More precisely, of generated images
for which the computed label output by the classifier
matches the target label, the percentage which are truly
adversarial (in the sense that the true label of the image
matches the intended true label passed to the generator
network) is reported.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 00 76 44 65 70 77 89 56 75 76
1 00 82 89 95 99 93 76 98 98 98
2 35 45 94 55 40 55 75 75 48 68
3 64 66 66 46 71 33 73 81 84 80
4 66 41 66 68 56 66 61 59 85 77
5 64 68 80 76 71 69 63 65 82 73
6 82 63 66 43 91 79 78 81 60 85
7 73 47 82 80 72 92 100 92 86 77
8 87 69 81 77 79 65 88 62 81 85
9 90 45 79 75 76 96 00 82 74 84
Mean 70 56 75 72 72 74 73 73 76 78 80
Figure 11: The success rates of the adversarial attacks
by a pretrained but not finetuned GAN. More precisely,
of generated images for which the computed label output
by the classifier matches the target label, the percentage
which are truly adversarial (in the sense that the true
label of the image matches the intended true label passed
to the generator network) is reported.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 45 48 46 43 38 61 51 44 59 53
1 00 64 74 72 62 78 83 73 75 79
2 52 43 53 41 52 35 48 54 40 55
3 64 41 62 43 60 29 51 56 58 50
4 59 45 49 36 45 53 55 49 69 65
5 48 46 44 63 62 60 49 57 61 50
6 76 48 44 46 54 54 38 62 54 58
7 51 32 60 59 54 54 46 61 65 65
8 62 53 62 57 56 56 54 50 67 57
9 47 42 51 60 72 69 54 66 71 67
Mean 57 44 54 55 55 54 52 55 59 61 60
Figure 12: Measures of how realistic the adversarial
images generated by finetuned GANs are. More pre-
cisely, the percentage of generated inputs for which the
classified label matches the target label which were not
identified as being generated when placed amongst nine
images from the training dataset. If the generated im-
ages were completely realistic, the expected result would
be 90.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 00 59 56 61 65 63 55 51 54 63
1 00 56 62 76 76 70 72 80 77 74
2 53 55 66 54 48 50 62 64 52 61
3 68 54 62 48 64 52 64 71 65 71
4 57 54 55 57 63 52 60 47 66 73
5 69 64 58 62 57 73 53 60 62 63
6 63 64 58 59 67 71 62 63 63 67
7 54 63 71 61 71 62 52 67 74 77
8 65 60 60 71 57 60 81 55 69 67
9 64 51 65 64 81 71 00 76 68 68
Mean 62 58 60 62 64 64 62 62 63 65 68
Figure 13: Measures of how realistic the adversarial
images generated by a pretrained but not finetuned
GAN are. More precisely, the percentage of generated
inputs for which the classified label matches the target
label which were not identified as being generated when
placed amongst nine images from the training dataset.
If the generated images were completely realistic, the
expected result would be 90.
17
E Results of Side-By-Side MTurk Experiments
Each figure shows the number of human judgements out of 100 which correctly identified the unrestricted adversarial
input in a side-by-side comparison with an image drawn from the dataset. If the generated images were completely
realistic, the expected result would be 50.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 23 29 24 30 25 20 22 17 22 28
1 00 14 19 16 26 38 25 21 21 24
2 24 25 18 25 21 17 26 17 19 29
3 22 24 17 31 28 25 24 24 30 20
4 25 25 28 20 21 28 22 17 23 19
5 23 16 24 27 29 23 19 27 21 21
6 19 21 25 21 19 25 20 28 18 23
7 23 27 22 26 17 24 25 29 16 21
8 25 25 21 21 24 23 24 25 28 23
9 18 21 22 27 27 24 23 28 23 28
Mean 22 23 22 23 24 24 25 23 23 22 24
Figure 14: Results against the locally-robust neural
network generated by finetuned GANs.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 43 37 42 42 41 36 43 38 45 36
1 00 29 40 38 40 39 40 43 37 34
2 45 30 38 36 35 39 44 41 31 40
3 35 35 38 36 45 34 42 44 38 36
4 30 42 42 40 36 35 47 42 38 42
5 35 43 40 35 34 34 42 36 37 44
6 44 46 46 42 37 42 45 41 38 36
7 32 38 38 42 42 43 33 35 46 45
8 41 41 44 46 37 37 36 43 42 44
9 45 41 35 47 44 40 40 52 36 49
Mean 38 40 39 41 38 40 36 44 40 39 41
Figure 15: Results against the locally-robust neural
network generated by a pretrained but not finetuned
GAN.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 23 32 23 22 22 23 19 24 27 23
1 00 31 32 31 28 30 36 41 29 28
2 24 28 31 22 24 30 26 31 20 28
3 30 26 30 20 20 25 19 21 25 23
4 27 28 25 20 28 27 25 26 27 30
5 29 25 25 25 24 23 25 22 22 28
6 30 22 27 17 30 28 20 32 23 29
7 18 24 30 32 25 24 22 34 26 34
8 28 29 19 23 22 28 27 26 26 37
9 29 21 20 31 28 33 21 44 30 38
Mean 27 25 27 26 25 26 25 27 29 25 30
Figure 16: Results against an ordinary neural network
generated by finetuned GANs.
Target label
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None
In
te
nd
ed
tr
ue
la
be
l
0 00 25 28 31 26 34 16 20 21 27
1 00 36 26 31 27 25 24 38 22 25
2 24 24 29 28 26 21 28 25 22 27
3 23 27 26 26 29 23 22 29 31 31
4 27 18 23 31 28 24 29 32 37 33
5 26 24 30 24 29 28 23 32 30 30
6 37 23 23 21 28 30 26 29 25 26
7 23 33 22 29 26 25 24 27 28 32
8 31 20 21 26 29 31 31 26 33 30
9 27 26 26 22 32 26 00 31 26 30
Mean 27 24 26 26 29 28 26 25 29 28 29
Figure 17: Results against an ordinary neural network
generated by a pretrained but not finetuned GAN.
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F Samples of Generated Unrestricted Adversarial Examples
(a) Intended true label ‘0’. (b) Intended true label ‘1’.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 18: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to perform an untargeted attack
on Wong and Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’. (Therefore not adversarial.)
(b) No expected-adversarial images were found for in-
tended true label 1.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 19: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 0 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’. (b) Intended true label ‘1’. (Therefore not adversarial.)
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 20: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 1 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’. (b) Intended true label ‘1’.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (Therefore not adversarial.) (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 21: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 2 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’.
(b) Intended true label ‘1’. These were the only adver-
sarial images found in 100 seconds.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’. (Therefore not adversarial.)
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 22: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 3 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’.
(b) Intended true label ‘1’. These were the only adver-
sarial images found in 100 seconds.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (Therefore not adversarial.) (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 23: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 4 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’. (b) Intended true label ‘1’.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’. (Therefore not adversarial.)
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 24: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 5 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’. (b) Intended true label ‘1’.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (Therefore not adversarial.) (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 25: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 6 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’.
(b) Intended true label ‘1’. These were the only adver-
sarial images found in 100 seconds.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’. (Therefore not adversarial.)
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 26: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 7 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’. (b) Intended true label ‘1’.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (Therefore not adversarial.) (j) Intended true label ‘9’.
Figure 27: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 8 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
(a) Intended true label ‘0’.
(b) Intended true label ‘1’. These were the only adver-
sarial images found in 100 seconds.
(c) Intended true label ‘2’. (d) Intended true label ‘3’.
(e) Intended true label ‘4’. (f) Intended true label ‘5’.
(g) Intended true label ‘6’. (h) Intended true label ‘7’.
(i) Intended true label ‘8’. (j) Intended true label ‘9’. (Therefore not adversarial.)
Figure 28: Examples of expected-adversarial images generated by a GAN finetuned to target label 9 for Wong and
Kolter’s locally-robust classifier network.
